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Abstract: 
We test core theories of the household using variants of a public good game and 
experimental data from 240 couples in rural Uganda. Spouses do not maximise 
surplus from cooperation and realise a greater surplus when women are in charge. 
This violates assumptions of unitary and cooperative models. When women control 
the common account, they receive less than when men control it; this contradicts 
standard bargaining models. Women contribute less than men and are rewarded more 
generously by men than vice versa. This casts doubt on postulates in Sen (1990). 
While the absence of altruism is rejected, we find evidence for opportunism. The 
results are put in a socioeconomic context using quantitative and qualitative survey 
data. Assortative matching and correlates of bargaining power influence behaviour 
within the experiments. Our findings suggest that a ￿one-size fits all￿ model of the 
household is unlikely to be satisfactory.  
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1. Introduction 
Experimental economics has acquired a reputation for testing directly the 
assumptions of economic models. Yet while aspects of the subject, such as individual 
choice have been the subject of a steady stream of experiments, there is a scarcity of 
experimental work within economics on household decision making.
1 This is all the 
more surprising given that most humans live and make decisions within the context of 
a shared household.  
The paucity of experimental research on household decision-making is not 
compensated by a profusion of insightful market or survey data. Much information is 
only available at the household level, making inference about intra-household 
behaviour problematic, though not impossible. For instance, results on aggregate data 
typically repudiate the unitary model in which household members act as if 
maximizing a single set of preferences (e.g. Alderman et al, 1995, Browning and 
Chiappori, 1998, Lundberg et al, 1997). However, such aggregate data are much less 
useful for identifying the more appropriate among competing household models and 
clarifying the micro-structure of household decisions.  
Experiments offer novel opportunities to test the causes of the failure of the 
unitary model and for comparing the performance of alternative household theories. 
In short, experimental data provides a way around the problem that different 
household models frequently produce identical reduced form expressions and 
predictions, making the models indistinguishable using available non-experimental 
                                                 
1 Two exceptions discussed below are Peters et al (2004) and Bateman and Munro (2003).   4
data.
2  
At the same time, experiments involving married couples are fundamentally 
different from those with anonymous play between strangers, since couples care more 
for each other￿s well-being, interact repeatedly and are better placed for making 
conjectures about each other￿s behaviour. Experiments involving spouses therefore 
have their own methodological hazards, created by differences between actual 
contexts and formal household theories.
3   While the former is characterised by 
repeated interaction, uncertainty and asymmetric information, the latter, necessarily 
simplifications of reality, are generally static and abstract from issues of uncertainty 
and asymmetric information.
4  
As Pahl (1990) and Woolley (2000) amongst others, have documented, 
asymmetric information about resources is a feature of many domestic relationships. 
Husbands and wives routinely hide income and expenditure from one another. It 
follows that to be accurate predictors of real-world behaviour, standard models of the 
household need to be robust to the presence of asymmetric information. 
We tackle these methodological issues using a suite of variants on classical 
                                                 
2 There is a shortage of empirical work testing the performance of alternative theories of the household.  
See Folbre (1984) and Rosenzweig and Schultz (1984) for an early debate on predictions, and Senauer 
et al (1988) on the issue of identical reduced form expressions. See also Haddad et al (1997).   
3 The repeated nature of real-world interactions implies that actions within the experiment may be 
undone by subsequent behaviour. To make robust inferences it is therefore important to have acts 
which cannot be wholly undone by subsequent and unobserved transfers between partners. Furthermore, 
since decisions within the experiment are likely to be influenced by equilibrium household behaviour 
outside the laboratory, it is valuable to have socio-economic data on likely correlates of the actions that 
do take place under the gaze of the experimenters. 
4 In a world of certainty, a game played between husband and wife may generate an allocation as its 
equilibrium prediction. When uncertainty is present, this household equilibrium may be a sharing rule 
￿ a mapping from the set of possible incomes for each partner to the allocation of that income to its 
different uses (Ligon 2002). Different sharing rules may support or undermine efficiency in the 
household. Farmer and Tiefenthaler (1995) review the limited evidence on sharing rules, suggesting 
that alongside efficiency concerns, norms of fairness and equity play a role in their determination.   5
public good games and a sample of married couples from Uganda to conduct the first 
experimental test of the assumptions and predictions of several classes of household 
models. Our experiment, discussed in more detail below, generates tests of surplus 
maximization, the influence of endowments and control on individual payoffs, 
altruism and opportunism. Furthermore we obtain evidence on the sharing rules that 
female and male spouses implement. 
Our main results can be summarized thus: surplus maximization is decisively 
rejected, while the identity of the decision-maker matters for efficiency - a greater 
proportion of the surplus is realised when women are in charge of the common 
account. These findings violate crucial assumptions of unitary models and cooperative 
models. Moreover, when women control the common account, they receive less than 
when men control it. This contradicts all standard bargaining models. Intriguingly, 
women￿s contributions are rewarded more generously by men than vice versa, and 
women contribute less to the household account than men do. This casts doubt on 
Sen￿s (1990) postulates of the undervaluation of female contributions and a female 
tendency to identify more closely with household interests, although to be fair he does 
not claim that these would hold in all contexts. The absence of altruism is rejected as 
decisively as surplus maximization. Love may indeed have got ￿something to do with 
it￿, but at the same time we find plenty of evidence for opportunism ￿ the tendency to 
hide initial endowments from one￿s partner even when one is in charge of the 
common account. 
We place our results in a socioeconomic context using three additional sources 
of information: first we use data from an exit survey that covered all couples who 
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participated in the experiment. Second, we take advantage of the fact that a minority 
of subjects had taken part in a previous and more extensive survey of household 
economic activities (Humphrey and Verschoor 2004, Mosley and Verschoor 2005). 
Using the former, we find strong support for a positive impact of assortative matching 
on household efficiency. From the latter we obtain some evidence that correlates of 
bargaining power affect behaviour within the experiment. Finally, some of our 
subjects were also participants in a follow-up study and we use the results of the 
qualitative interviews to cast further light on our results.  
In Section 2 the main classes of household models tested are introduced and 
the predictions that we focus on spelt out. Section 3 presents our experimental design 
in terms of tests of hypotheses implied by these models. Section 4 reports on the 
research sites, and on the implementation of the experiments. Section 5 presents 
univariate and bivariate tests of our hypotheses and Section 6 examines the socio-
economic context and reflects on the implications of the findings of the qualitative 
follow-up survey. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Background and motivation 
 
Most formal models of household behaviour can be classified under the 
rubrics  unitary, Pareto-efficient or cooperative and non-cooperative  models 
(Alderman et al, 1995, Haddad et al. 1997). In the unitary approach (Samuelson 1956, 
Becker 1965), the household is modelled as a single agent with a unified set of 
preferences: all income is therefore pooled and the identity of the income recipient 
does not affect household decisions.  The key feature of cooperative models (McElroy 
and Horney 1981, Manser and Brown 1980) is the assumption of Pareto efficiency,   7
usually within a context of bargaining where power depends on ￿threat-points￿ and 
control of the allocation. Empirically, therefore a key difference between unitary and 
cooperative models is that in the latter, the identity of the individual controlling 
resources affects decisions, with individual rewards increasing in the share of 
household resources. Meanwhile, in non-cooperative models (Ulph 1988, Woolley 
1988), household members make their contributions to household public goods 
separately in the standard format of a non-cooperative game. Efficiency is not a 
prediction of static, non-cooperative models, but income pooling can be - so that 
individual rewards may or may not be increasing in the individual shares of household 
income.  
A number of models step beyond this simple classification, such as Lundberg 
and Pollak (1993)￿s separate-spheres theory and Sen￿s (1990) cooperative conflict 
model, an influential hybrid theory tailored for developing country contexts. In the 
latter, the perceived interests and perceived contributions of a household member also 
affect intra-household distribution. In particular he postulates that women identify 
more closely than men with the household￿s interests and should be expected to invest 
more, but these female contributions also tend to be undervalued. This undervaluation 
will ￿vary from one society to another￿ with its effect being ￿more regressive for 
women in some societies￿ (1990: 137). 
Early empirical tests focused on the income pooling assumption in unitary 
models and the notion that intrahousehold allocations are independent of the identity 
of the person earning income or controlling an asset (e.g. Schultz 1990, Thomas 1990, 
Browning et al, 1994, Hoddinott and Haddad 1995). These studies found a strong 
impact of gender identity on labour supply and on the health outcomes of children,   8
thus rejecting the pooling assumption. Meanwhile, Phipps et al. (1998) suggest that 
husbands and wives pool incomes for some but not other categories of consumption. 
While the evidence against the unitary model is fairly consistent, that for cooperative 
models is less clear-cut. Browning and Chiappori (1998) conclude in favour of Pareto 
efficiency, while Jones￿ (1983) research and Cameroon and Udry￿s (1996) analysis of 
the multi-plot farming systems cultivated by rural households in Burkina Faso cast 
doubt on the empirical soundness of the Pareto efficiency assumption.   
There are a small number of recognisably economic experiments on household 
decision-making. In common with the non-experimental literature, the results of these 
papers reject the unitary model. Using a common pool game with a voluntary 
contribution mechanism, Peters et al. (2004) compare free-riding behaviour among 
household members with a control group of strangers in the USA and find 
contributions within family groups to be higher and reductions over time weaker.
5 
One problem with these results is that in Peters et al￿s samples, many family groups 
were missing one or more of their adult members. Moreover, using UK couples and a 
series of incentivised choices, Bateman and Munro (2003) test for Pareto-efficiency, 
income pooling and the unitary model, but do not quantify the inefficiency they 
observe. In Ashraf￿s (2005) study of saving and consumption decisions in the 
Philippines, spouses receive an endowment that is invested or consumed subject to 
alternative experimental conditions. She finds men￿s saving behaviour to be strategic 
and responsive to whether information about endowments, payoffs and behaviour is 
private or public, and to whether communication is allowed. Women￿s behaviour, in 
contrast, is invariant to changes in the experimental conditions. However, the random 
                                                 
5 More generally, Frolich et al (2004) argue that adding social context and familiarity to an anonymous 
experimental setting tends to increase contributions and reduce free-riding behaviour.    9
lottery device she deploys means that the opportunities for risk sharing differ across 
treatments, making it difficult to draw firm conclusions.  
In short, therefore, none of the preceding experiments provide a quantitative 
test of household efficiency on a proper sample of couples using an incentive 
compatible design. Our design overcomes these deficiencies, examines hypotheses 
associated with Sen￿s theory and tests for household sharing rules. More precisely, we 
provide the first experimental tests of the following hypotheses:   
I.  Husbands and wives maximise the total resources available for distribution ￿ 
predicted by the unitary model 
II.  Household efficiency is independent of the identity of the allocator ￿ 
predicted by the unitary model 
III.  Holding total endowments constant,  individual payoffs are increasing in 
endowment levels ￿ which distinguishes unitary from cooperative models 
IV.  Control of the allocation raises an individual￿s payoff ￿ which again 
distinguishes unitary from cooperative models 
V.  Allocation to an individual is increasing in that individual￿s contributions ￿ a 
test for the existence of sharing rules/reciprocity 
VI.  Female contributions are undervalued ￿ a possibility implied by the 
cooperative conflict model 
VII.  Controlling for valuation of contributions, women want to contribute more 
to the common pool than men ￿ another expectation in the cooperative 
conflict model   10
In addition, we test the hypotheses that altruism (VIII) and opportunism
6 (IX) 
are absent, the former because it is natural to do so, the latter to see in the light of the 
evidence that married partners routinely hide assets from each other. 
3. Design 
 
The vehicle for our hypothesis tests is the following set of variants of a two-
person game with four stages. At stage 1, each spouse i is endowed with endowment 
Ni, where N1+N2 = 4000 and Ni ε {0,2000,4000}. In the second stage she or he makes 
a contribution of xi  (0  ≤ x i  ≤ N i) to a common pool. In the third stage total 
contributions are multiplied by 1.5 and in the final stage either one individual decides 
on the allocation of the common pool or the pool is split 50:50. The payout to 
individual i is zi so that an individual￿s monetary payoff is Ni ￿ xi + zi while the total 
value of the pool is y (= 1.5(x1+x2) = z1 + z2). 
There are nine possible variants of the game and they are summarised in Table 
1. Cells lower in the table represent variants with larger female endowments while 
cells to the right represent variants with greater female control over the division of the 
common pool. The 50:50 variants are common pool games. Variants where one 
person has the entire endowment while also controlling the allocation are dictator 
games, whereas variants where the identity of the investing individual and the 
allocating individual differ are games of trust. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
In table 1, two of the variant cells do not contain numbers. These are dictator 
                                                 
6 Oliver E. Williamson, 1975, p 6 defines opportunism as a ￿a condition of self-interest seeking with 
guile.￿ We define our measure of it in the next section.   11
games that were omitted from the final design because of the lack of interaction 
between partners and our desire to examine issues of trust. The numbers listed in the 
other cells label the variants used in the experiment. Two cells contain two numbers 
because these variants were conducted in both locations. 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Let us now consider predictions in Table 2 where the numbering corresponds 
with the tests announced in Section 2. In all variants of the game, total surplus 
maximization (I) implies that each player should set xi = Ni. The null hypothesis that 
efficiency is independent of the identity of the allocator (II) can be tested for by 
comparing total contributions, i.e. x1 + x2, in games 3 with 5 and 8 with 9, respectively. 
Moreover, the hypothesis that endowment raises payoffs (III) implies that Ni ￿ xi + zi 
should increase with Ni and can be tested by comparing behaviour in variant 2 with 5 
and behaviour in 3 with 6. The hypothesis that control raises payoffs (IV) implies that 
Ni ￿ xi + zi should be higher with control than without. Alternatively, since one agent 
has no control over their partner￿s contribution we can test the hypothesis that zi/y is 
higher with control by comparing behaviour in variant 2 with 6, 3 with 5 and 8 with 9.  
We define the degree of reciprocity, or contribution-based sharing, as the 
responsiveness of the allocation of the common account by one spouse to the 
contribution made by the partner. We are able to test the null hypothesis that 
reciprocity is zero (V) in variants 2, 3, 5, 6, 8 and 9. In the same variants gender 
differences in contribution-based rewards, and in particular a potential undervaluation 
of female contributions (VI), may be detected. Meanwhile if a household sharing rule 
exists then the responsiveness of men to female contributions should be equal to the 
responsiveness of women to male contributions.    12
If women anticipate, correctly or not, that their contributions will be 
undervalued, they may contribute less to the common pool than men even if they 
would have contributed more than men had they anticipated that their contributions 
would be valued equally. The only clear indication of a relatively strong intrinsic 
female preference for contributing to the common pool (VII) is therefore provided in 
the variants in which the sharing rule is fixed, by comparing male with female 
behaviour in variants 1 and 7, respectively, as well as in variant 4.  
The null hypothesis in the test for altruism (VIII) is that z-i  = 0, where z-i is the 
allocation to the other partner, when i is in control of the allocation. 
In all the games, the private endowment Ni was revealed only to individual i. 
The common account and the final allocation from that account was common 
knowledge. In the {4,000: 0} games both partners were told that one of them received 
nothing, and the other some amount between zero and 4,000. Meanwhile, in the 
{2,000: 2,000} games both partners were told that they received some, potentially 
different amount between 100 shillings and 4,000 shillings. 
We did not reveal full information about each individual￿s endowment, in part 
as a response to ethical concerns about the creation of family disputes if all 
information was revealed. As we mentioned above, theories of household behaviour 
have had little to say on the impact of asymmetric information on outcomes, despite 
the widespread evidence of its presence within the household. A total surplus 
maximizer has no incentive to withhold contributions, even with asymmetric 
information. Other types of players may wish to hide some or all of their endowment 
from their partner. In the experiment, they could achieve this by not placing it in the 
common pool, but because there are other motives for not investing which would   13
apply even if endowments were common knowledge, we cannot simply interpret all 
failures to invest as evidence of attempted deception. For instance a selfish player in 
variants 1, 4 or 7 may not invest any sum because the net private return is negative. 
The clearest evidence of attempts to deceive is therefore provided in variants where 
the potential investor also controls the allocation. In this context we measure 
opportunism as the difference Ni ￿ xi in games where player i has Ni > 0 and is the 
allocator. In variants 3, 5, 8, 9, we test the null hypothesis that opportunism is zero 
(IX). 
4. Context  
 
Bufumbo sub-county and Sironko District are on the slopes of Mt Elgon in 
south eastern Uganda. This is a densely settled area with an average population 
density of 284 per km
2 and average farm size of 1.4-1.5 ha and rainfall of about 
1186mm (Wakamire 2001). Livelihoods are predominantly agricultural, but still 
complex and diverse with overlapping production units engaged in crop production, 
livestock rearing, labouring, petty trading and services, and both joint and individual 
enterprises are pursued by household members. Both districts have mainly fertile 
volcanic loams but Sironko is flat, low-lying and has a greater proportion of sandy 
loam soils suited for maize, beans, soya, groundnuts and sunflower cultivation. Its 
nucleated centre has more diverse non farming livelihoods, better housing and 
infrastructure, including electricity, than its outer villages. Bufumbo is higher, wetter, 
poorer and hillier than Sironko and lacks electricity.  
We chose to locate the experiments in these two areas partly because of the 
expectation that we would see distinctive forms of conjugality determined by the   14
predominantly Christian nature of Sironko and the Muslim character of Bufumbo. 
However, other differences such as in cropping patterns, and therefore gender 
divisions of labour, are possibly more likely to explain the variations between the two 
sites that emerge in our experimental results (see Section 7).  
Most residents of Sironko and Bufumbo are Bagisu, a group known for very 
high levels of violence which is predominantly within kin groups, perpetrated by men 
on other men, and closely linked to accusations of thieving and witchcraft (Heald 
1998, Roscoe 1924, La Fontaine 1959). According to Heald (1998), this is driven by 
intense conflict over access to resources, and gender ideals of male provider roles 
which are increasingly difficult for men to fulfil. Her emphasis on the absence of trust 
between male kin is echoed in broader research on comparative social capital, in 
which the district emerges as having extremely low levels of expressed trust, low 
levels of voluntary activity, and a low social capital index compared to seven other 
Ugandan locations (Widner and Mundt 1998). 
If kinship, for men, is infused with mistrust, marriage is a comparative haven 
of trust despite the instability of marriage amongst the Gisu. Gender relations between 
men and women are expressed formally in terms of absolute male control, but in 
reality women have considerable freedom to marry who they choose, divorce and 
remarry readily when marriage is unsatisfactory, and generally exercise the power that 
comes from men￿s dependence on marriage for managing their reputations, and 
achievement of an important element of adult masculinity.  Marital failure has very 
dramatic consequences for men, and may be fatal, since bachelors and divorced men 
are socially ridiculed, suspected of sorcery and theft, and ultimately sanctioned with 
violence (Heald 1998).  
The experiments in Sironko took place on consecutive days in March 2005   15
with experiments implemented in Bufumbo on the following day. Venues were a 
Roman Catholic church (Sironko) and the headquarters of the sub-county (Bufumbo). 
LC1 chairmen (leaders of a village council) were approached two weeks beforehand 
and asked to mobilise the couples that took part in the previous survey (see Section 1). 
In addition they were asked to recruit additional (co-habiting) married couples to 
make up the required number for the experiments. 
One game was played at the time and the only people present in the hall were 
couples playing that game and the game organisers. Instructions and examples took 
approximately 30 minutes on average. The local game organisers are well-qualified 
for implementing experiments even of considerably greater complexity than the one 
on which we report here (Humphrey and Verschoor 2004; Mosley and Verschoor 
2005) and were satisfied with subjects￿ understanding of the game. Indeed, in 
spontaneously offered feedback immediately after the game and in the follow-up 
interviews, no respondent said they had found the game unclear or confusing. Each 
spouse received an envelope after the game had been explained and demonstrated. 
The contents of the envelope were such that any multiple of 100 shillings could be left 
in it. 
Secrecy was ensured by calling one couple at a time with the husband going to 
one corner of the hall and his wife to the other; each spouse removed from their 
envelope what they wanted to keep for themselves, with the remainder left for the 
common account. A helper then collected their envelopes and recorded the decisions. 
Collusion within a single game was avoided by a threat of exclusion (which proved to 
be highly effective); collusion between games on the same day was avoided by 
keeping waiting groups apart in a school (Sironko) or separately on the grass 
(Bufumbo). Collusion across days (relevant for Sironko only) was mitigated by   16
playing the unequal-endowment games on the first day and the equal-endowment 
games the next day.  
5. Results 
 
We first present an overview of the basic results, with simple univariate and 
bivariate hypotheses tests. In the following section we use data from the exit survey 
for more in-depth examination of household and spousal characteristics that impact on 
efficiency and therefore team performance, i.e. household capacity to realise 
cooperative gains.  
Tests of surplus maximisation (I) 
Finding 1: Surplus maximisation is rejected 
Table 3 and the accompanying figure 1 give an overview of the results from 
the 240 couples (49 from Bufumbo, 191 from Sironko). In the table, the columns 
headed ￿Female x￿ and ￿Male x￿ give the mean fraction of endowments invested by 
women and men respectively. The next two columns show mean payoffs (including 
the portion of the endowment not invested). ￿Total x￿ is the fraction of the available 
surplus which is generated by the household with the accompanying sample standard 
deviation in the adjoining column. The final column reports a t-test for the null 
hypothesis that households maximize total surplus. This null hypothesis is decisively 
rejected in all variants.  
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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Finding 2: For the equivalent variants, total contributions are higher in 
Sironko than in Bufumbo. 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of total surplus, measured as a fraction of the 
potential total for the 9 different variants. Reinforcing the message of Table 3, there 
are compelling contrasts between the variants, but in a narrow majority of 
observations the total surplus is not realised. However, in all variants except 8 and 9 
(the Bufumbo variants) the modal surplus is 1, and in variants 1, 2, 4, 5 and 7 the 
median surplus is 1. Overall, in Sironko a clear majority of couples (56.5%) maximize 
total surplus, but in Bufumbo no couple realises more than 90 % of the total surplus. 
Using a two-sided, unequal variances t-test we examine the null hypothesis that 
location makes no difference to the surplus generated, by comparing outcomes in 
games 8 and 9 with 3 and 5 respectively. In both comparisons the null hypothesis is 
rejected with p values of 0.005 and 0.0004 respectively. In short therefore, the 
realisation of cooperative potential and thus the size of efficiency losses in the two 
locations is very different and this is one of the major lessons of our paper.  
Finding 3: A fixed sharing rule does not alter contribution levels 
We test whether control of the allocation of the common pool makes a 
difference to contribution levels in two ways. First we compare variants with a 50:50 
split to ones where one partner controls the allocation. There are four comparisons of 
this kind (see Table 4) and the tests are two-sided since there are arguments on both 
sides about how transferring control (decision-making power) might impact on 
contributions. In this table ￿Mean y￿ is the fraction of the total available surplus 
realised in the game. Results for the test (the t-statistic and below it the associated 
probability value) are given in the final column of the table.  In general the null is not   18
rejected.
7 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
Finding 4: When women control allocation both male and female 
contributions are higher 
Secondly we compare levels of contribution in the variants where the man 
controls the allocation of the common pool to levels of contribution in variants where 
the woman makes the decision (see the second part of Table 4). Again the test is two-
sided. The null (hypothesis II) is rejected at the 5% level in Sironko and rejected at the 
10% level in Bufumbo. In both sites, total surplus is higher when women control the 
allocation (games 5 and 9). 
Obviously total contribution is the sum of the contributions by the two 
partners, so we can dig deeper by analysing the impact of control on individual 
contributions. Table 5 summarises the six comparisons, four of which involve variants 
in which both partners received endowments and two where one partner received the 
entire endowment.  
The column headed ￿Mean x￿ shows mean contribution levels, x, by gender for 
the relevant variants. The adjacent column shows respectively the t statistic and 
probability value for a two tailed independent samples test that the mean values of x 
are the same in each variant being compared. For each comparison, wives control the 
allocation for the second variant listed and in each case female control leads to higher 
contribution by both sexes. In short, both genders invest more when women are in 
                                                 
7 Whether a fixed sharing outperforms discretionary allocations by spouses with regard to efficiency is 
likely to depend on the chosen sharing rule. In terms of incentive provision, the adopted 50/50 split is a 
primitive rule; even so Sironko spouses fail to outperform the 50/50 split.        19
charge of the allocation. In one case (women in Bufumbo) the difference between 
games is significant at the 1% level. In two other cases it is significant at the 10% 
level with a two sided test. The final two columns depict the fraction of the final 
payoff received by each gender and then the mean payoff. The asterisks indicate 
significant differences, but to save space the values of the t-statistic and associated p 
values are not reported. A common pattern emerges: contrary to predictions of 
standard bargaining models, greater control is associated with the receipt of a lower 
fraction of total payoffs and simultaneously a lower absolute level of payoff.   
TABLE 5 HERE. 
Test of opportunism (IX) 
Finding 5: The null of no opportunism is rejected 
We can also use Table 5 to test for opportunism. If there is no opportunism, 
the value of mean x for male players in games 3 and 8 should equal 2000, as should 
the value of mean x for female players in games 5 and 9. In all cases the null 
hypothesis is rejected, with p values of 0.000.  
Tests of the impacts of endowments on payouts (III) 
Finding 6: While male allocators respond to changes in endowments in 
accordance with theoretical predictions, female allocators do not  
Above we found that decision-making power or control was not associated 
with higher payoffs. We now turn the attention to another potential source of power, 
namely that associated with resource control or endowments. To identify the effect of 
initial endowments on receipts from the common pool when the same spouse decides   20
the split, receipts in games 2 and 5 are compared with those of games 3 and 6.  In 
games 5 and 2 the allocation is decided by the wife while the wife￿s endowment falls 
from 2000 to 0. The mean receipts for women now increase slightly from 2416 to 
2532. In games 3 and 6 control of allocation is in the hands of husbands while the 
endowment of the men decreases from 2000 to 0. Here the mean receipts for men fall 
from 3108 to 1164. The observed difference is significant only for husbands in games 
3 and 6 (p-value 0.01). Hence, while male allocators respond to endowment changes 
in accordance with theoretical predictions, female allocators do not (tested in Sironko 
only). 
Tests of contribution-based sharing (reciprocity) (V) 
Finding 7: We find evidence for male reciprocity in Sironko, but not in 
Bufumbo and no evidence for female reciprocity 
For the relevant variants figure 2 summarises the extent to which spouses 
repay the contribution of their partners. It plots the allocation to the non-controlling 
spouse against individual contribution levels together with lines of best fit.  
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
The fitted lines, estimated using OLS, are summarised in table 6. While the 
lines are upwards sloping (suggesting positive responses to the partner￿s contribution), 
the statistical conclusions are weaker. In general, we conclude in favour of male 
reciprocity in Sironko (i.e. games 3 and 6), but find no evidence of similar behaviour 
among female allocators. It is also unclear whether there is a net return for the 
investors, i.e. whether the slopes are greater than 1.  The implications for theories of 
household behaviour are intriguing: suggesting the absence of household-level   21
contribution-based sharing rules.  
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
Tests of gender differences in contributions and relative valuations of 
contributions (VII and VI) 
Finding 8: We find no evidence that women contribute more to the common 
pool than men do 
For the variants in which the sharing rule is fixed, so that contributions cannot 
be interpreted as being influenced by expectations of the spouse￿s generosity, we find 
no statistically significant differences in contribution levels (Table 7).  
TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
Finding 9a): In Sironko, male allocators contribute more and award 
themselves less than their wives, while female allocators contribute less and award 
themselves the same as their husbands. 
In other comparisons using observations on female and male contributions and 
payoffs in table 5, the results are more nuanced. Again we do not find support for the 
unconditional hypothesis of greater female contributions. In game 3 where men 
control the allocation, women receive more than men (p=0.07, one tailed t-test) while 
contributing less (p=0.04, one tailed t-test). In game 5, when Sironko women have 
control, women continue to contribute less than men ￿ this difference is again 
statistically significant (p=0.049, one-tailed t-test). At the same time the receipts from 
the game for the two spouses are indistinguishable.  
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Finding 9 b) In Bufumbo, male allocators contribute the same and award 
themselves the same as their wives, while female allocators contribute more and 
award themselves the same as their husbands.       
Turning to Bufumbo, women contribute slightly less and receive more than 
men when men are in control, but neither of these differences is statistically 
significant. With female control men receive more from the game than women and 
contribute less, with only the latter being statistically significant (p=0.035, one-tailed 
t-test). It would thus seem that Sen￿s concepts of perceived interests and contributions 
perform rather poorly. Inequality in these variants is driven not by exploitation of the 
spouse by the party in control ￿ but rather by generosity by the spouse in control vis-
￿-vis the partner. Where inequality in receipts emerges, more power thus has the 
opposite effect of what most theories would predict.     
Tests of altruism (VIII) 
Finding 10: The null of no altruism is rejected 
The data can be used to test for the absence of altruism. In all cases the 
absence is decisively rejected at any recognised significance levels. 
To sum up: although surplus maximization is the most common outcome in 
the experiment the majority of partners do not contribute their full endowment to the 
common pool. In Bufumbo no couple achieves the maximum available surplus. We 
find clear evidence of opportunism and that, contrary to the predictions of standard 
bargaining models, having control of the allocation reduces the payoff. On the other 
hand, higher endowment does not necessarily lead to higher payoffs but there is again 
a noted gendered difference in whether this prediction holds or not. There is evidence   23
that female control leads to greater contribution in both sexes. We find no evidence 
that women want to contribute more to the common pool than men nor that their 
contributions are undervalued by men.  
6. Socio-economic effects 
 
In this section we contextualise the results presented in Section 5 by relating 
them to the socio-economic characteristics of spouses and households. First, let us 
focus on contributions to the common pool.  To examine if surplus maximisation is 
affected by the characteristics of spouses, the ratio of total contributions to total 
endowments is regressed on socio-economic variables while controlling for location 
and games.  The unconditional expected values from a Tobit are given in Table 8. 
Three variants of the equation are presented: first the data pooled across all 
participants and then husbands and wives estimated separately. 
TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
As reported previously, contributions are significantly lower in Bufumbo than 
in Sironko.  Spouses with the same employment and educational levels contribute 
significantly more.  In short, spouses with similar characteristics seem to do better in 
terms of generating cooperative surplus, underlining the importance of assortative 
matching for efficiency and household team performance. For instance, teacher 
spouses contribute more compared to other occupations.
8  Possibly, there is something 
different about teachers compared to all other occupations, but given the available 
information it is difficult to know what exactly that difference is.    24
In the pooled equation, the total contribution is negatively affected by the age 
of the wife (a quadratic term on age is not statistically significant).  This is a result of 
two forces. First, older women contribute less to the common pool than younger 
women. Second, husbands with older wives contribute less.  Both these effects 
operate in the same direction and hence contributions drop with age of wife.
9   
The above results capture the overall contribution behaviour of the couples.  
To examine for possible heterogeneity in the behaviour of spouses similar regressions 
for husbands and wives are separately estimated and results reported in subsequent 
columns. The results supporting the importance of assortative matching come out less 
strongly in these regressions, but the difference in male and female contribution 
behaviour is interesting.  Men married to women with the same level of education 
contribute significantly more; but matching in education is not significant for female 
contributions.  Women married to men with the same occupation as their own 
contribute significantly more; but matching in employment is not a significant 
determinant of men￿s contributions.  Hence, the influence of assortative matching 
seen in the pooled regressions is mainly a result of the effect of educational matching 
for men and occupational matching for women. The contribution of men to the 
common pool increases if they are married to women of similar education as theirs 
and the contribution of women increases if they are married to men with the same 
occupation as theirs.  In both cases spouses married to teachers contribute more (at 
least at 10% level of significance).  In addition, the negative effect on contribution of 
the age of the other spouse holds in both cases; both men and women with older 
                                                                                                                                          
8 If the dummy for ￿wife is a teacher￿ is dropped and ￿husband is a teacher￿ is included the latter will be significant 
(but at lesser level of significance); due to collinearity, both cannot be included in the regression. 
9 This is also true for husbands￿ age; due to collinearity both husband and wife age cannot be included in the 
regression.   25
spouses contribute less. 
We now turn to the behaviour of spouses when distributing the common pool. 
The reciprocity of husbands (wives) to their wives (husbands) can be measured by 
examining how much money husbands allocate to their wives (husbands) in games 
where they decide the allocation ￿ games 3, 6 and 8 for husbands and games 2, 5 and 
9 for wives.  For games 3, 6 and 8 the amount wives receive and for games 2, 5 and 9 
the amount husbands receive are regressed on the same socio-economic variables as 
before.  The results are given in Table 9. 
TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE 
As indicated in previous sections, husbands reciprocate to their wives more 
than wives do.  For a shilling contribution from wives, husbands give them 1.5 
shillings ￿ the contribution plus the surplus ￿ but wives give their husbands less than 
that.
10 The socio-economic variables in the tobit for males are not significant.  But in 
the regression for females, ￿same education￿ and ￿husband￿s age￿ are significant.  The 
two contrasting results would seem to suggest that while husbands￿ distributional 
behaviour is determined by some fixed rule independent of the socio-economic 
characteristics of spouses, female behaviour is influenced by male characteristics.  It 
is also interesting to note that the coefficients on ￿same occupation￿ and ￿husband￿s 
age￿ are of opposite signs to those in the contribution regressions.  Wives invest more 
when married to young husbands with the same occupation as their own; but they 
allocate more of the common pool to older husbands with a different occupation.  
Different sets of factors thus seem to influence contribution and allocation decisions.    26
In the sample, a subset of 68 couples had taken part in the previously 
mentioned survey.  Information on whether women keep receipts from crop sales was 
gathered in the survey; this can be used as a reflection of ￿bargaining power￿ of 
women.  Table 10 shows the results for an OLS regression with robust standard 
errors.  Female receipts in the games are regressed on dummy variables for Bufumbo 
(￿Bufumbo￿), for games where men control the allocation ("Male control"), for games 
with the 50:50 rule (￿Equal￿) and for whether women keep receipts from crop sales 
(￿Keep￿); in addition, the initial endowment of males in the games is included.  As the 
coefficient for ￿keep￿ indicates, women with stronger ￿bargaining power￿ receive 
more in the games (the coefficient is statistically significant at 5% level).  
TABLE 10 HERE.  
  The follow-up qualitative survey found that subjects, interviewed separately 
and simultaneously as couples, were positive about their experience of the experiment. 
The retention of the money used in the game was obviously popular, but many 
spontaneously mentioned that the game had taught them about saving and sharing. 
Respondents were asked what was in their minds when they decided on how much to 
retain and to allocate to the common pool and some responses suggest that particular 
needs at the time of the games were uppermost in some women￿s minds, such as 
getting money to buy seeds for personal plots, thus raising the possibility that 
allocation behaviour may be seasonally varied.   
Corfman and Lehmann (1987) found that couples use experiments to further 
relationship goals, and something of this may be going on here as well. Some 
                                                                                                                                          
10 The test for the coefficient on husband￿s contribution to be one is accepted with F- and p-values of 
0.37 and 0.5471 respectively.  Hence, females give back approximately 1 shilling for 1 shilling 
contribution of husbands.   27
responses indicated that the games were seen as occasions to demonstrate generosity 
towards a partner, or indeed to show the game managers that they had complied with 
what they saw as the ￿lesson￿ of the game - pooling is a good thing and thus rewarded. 
To the extent that these responses were indicative of the whole sample it would 
suggest that greater co-operation was observed in the experiment than might be true of 
routine household decision-making. 
8. Some thoughts on the findings  
 
We began this paper by noting the widespread field evidence against the 
unitary model. Our results confirm this evidence: on average 21% of the surplus 
available remains unclaimed, suggesting that spouses are willing to pay a significant 
price to retain control over their own endowments. At the same time, subjects were 
publicly generous, with the typical controller of the allocation receiving less than 50% 
of the payout.  
Sen￿s perceived interest hypothesis would suggest that women would be 
inclined to allocate most, or even all of their endowment to the household pool, but 
the experiments showed this not to be the case. There was no evidence of women 
wanting to contribute more to the common pool than men. This may mean that they 
do not see their wellbeing as spouse-dependent in this way or that they do but chose to 
behave differently in the context of the game, or that they articulate relational well-
being as a cultural convention whilst actually behaving differently. There is little 
evidence thus far that the female participants in these games, as Sen suggested, have a 
lower sense of their personal welfare than men.  
Our examination of allocation behaviour in relation to socio-economic 
characteristics of spouses also suggests that the allocation behaviour of husbands is   28
more rule bound and independent of the socio-economic characteristics of wives ￿ 
whilst that of wives seems to be affected by the socioeconomic characteristics of 
husbands. Supporting this idea, male behaviour was more sensitive to the level of 
female contributions than vice versa. These features of the data suggest that there are 
no agreed sharing rules at the household level, possibly pointing to different norms of 
reciprocity and fairness across men and women. Adding further ammunition to these 
indications of systematic differences in male and female behaviour, male allocators 
were found to behave in accordance with theoretical predictions by responding to 
changes in endowments, while no similar response was observed for female allocators.  
Conjugal contracts are not static but vary both historically and over the course 
of a marriage and we see this reflected in our findings on the behaviour of spouses in 
relation to individual characteristics: older women contribute less compared to 
younger ones, and husbands contribute less when wives are older. This may conceal a 
historical effect ￿ since both spouses contribute less when they are older it may speak 
of an earlier more individualised conjugal contract in the past which continues to 
govern norms for older couples. Or it may be an aspect of a domestic development 
cycle whereby younger couples who are building families with younger children are 
engaged in a kind of ￿reproductive cooperation￿ which induces a greater commitment 
to joint ventures (eg in relation to education costs) than in later stages when the 
imperatives for cooperation are weaker. The factors that shape the intensity and 
character of cooperation between spouses are likely to produce age specific effects. 
Contributions to the pooled fund are higher in the Christian Sironko than in 
the Muslim Bufumbo. We had originally thought that we may find two very 
distinctive forms of conjugality in Sironko and Bufumbo, but the qualitative fieldwork   29
failed to identify clearly distinctive religious identities.
11  A more likely explanation 
may lie in the different cropping patterns of the two areas.  Bananas and coffee 
dominate the upland Bufumbo farming system, and maize and beans the lowland 
Sironko farming system. The gender division of labour is likely to be very different in 
each location, with a lower level of women￿s labour involved in perennial coffee and 
banana, and a more sex segregated pattern of labour and control, and a higher level of 
more sex sequential operations in maize and bean cultivation.
12  Whatever the sources 
of the differences in behaviour, their pronounced nature strongly suggests that a ￿one-
size fits all￿ model of the household is unlikely to be satisfactory.  
                                                 
11 There was no veiling or seclusion of Muslim women, only a minority of Muslim men marking their 
identity with caps, the response was blank incomprehension when asked about religious identity in 
relation to marriage, and indeed a number of marriages were between Muslims and Christians. 
12 See Whitehead (1985). Elements of agricultural production may be gendered at the level of the whole 
crop, i.e. sex segregated, or through interdigitated processes in a single enterprise, i.e. sex sequential 
(e.g. maize where men plough, women plant, women weed, both sexes harvest, women process and 
men market).   30
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Table 1. Variants of the game played. 
Endowment to woman 
(given total endowment of 
4000) ↓ 








0   1  2 
2000  3, 8  4  5, 9 
4000 6  7   
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Table 2. Predictions. 
I. Total surplus 
maximization 
xi = Ni  All variants 
II. Household efficiency is 
independent of the identity 
of allocator 
x1+x2 is identical under male 
and female control 
3 with 5, 8 with 9 
III. Endowment raises 
payoffs 
Ni - xi + zi increases in Ni  2 with 5, 3 with 6 
IV. Control raises payouts  zi / y higher with control  2 with 6, 3 with 5, 8 with 9 
V. Contribution-based 
sharing 
zi / y increases in xi  2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9 
VI. Undervaluation of 
female contributions 
zi / y increases less in xi for i 
= female than for i = male 
2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9 
VII. Women contribute 
more to the common pool 
xi higher for i = female  1 with 7, 4 
VIII. No altruism  z-i = 0  2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9 
IX. No opportunism  Ni - xi = 0  3, 5, 8, 9 
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t-test for H0: 
Total = 1 
p-value  
1 
































25  0.676  0.596 2436 2860 0.639 0.188 
-9.608
0.000***
  240  0.788  0.790 2978 2605  
*** indicates significant at 1% level 
** indicates significant at 5% level 
Note: Following Godfrey (1988) and Moffat and Peters (2001), the p-values reported and 
critical values used for this test are for a 2 sided test even though the test itself is one-
sided. This is because the null is on the boundary of the possible parameter distribution 
(i.e. efficiency cannot be greater than 1).   38
 
 
Table 4. Control of the allocation and total contribution levels. 
Comparison  Variant  N  Mean y  Std. Deviation  T statistic 
p value 
50:50 split (first variant) versus control by an individual (second variant).  
1  1  26  0.904 0.201 -0.794 
  2  25  0.940 0.109 0.431 
2  4  30  0.769 0.255 0.438 
  3  27  0.718 0.242 -0.781 
3  4  30  0.769 0.255 -1.204 
  5  25  0.845 0.202 0.234 
4  7  32  0.887 0.189 0.288 
  6  26  0.833 0.193 -1.072 
Control by husband (first variant) versus control by wife (second variant). 
Comparison  Variant  N  Mean y  Std. Deviation T statistic 
p value 
1  3  27  0.718 0.242 -2.054** 
  5  25  0.845 0.202 0.045 
2  8  24  0.534 0.199 -1.910* 
  9  25  0.639 0.188 0.065 
** indicates significant at 5% level, 2 tailed test 
* indicates significant at 10% level, 2 tailed test 
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Table 5. Control, individual contribution levels and payoffs. 






1  Female   3  27 1296 -1.863* 0.570  3122
     5  25 1584 0.068 0.491  2833
2  Male   3  27 1574 -1.708* 0.430  2318
     5  25 1800 0.094 0.509  2860
3  Female   8  24 1021 -2.97*** 0.523  2675
     9  25 1352 0.005 0.458  2436
4  Male   8  24 1117 -0.602 0.477  2458
     9  25 1204 0.550 0.542  2860
5  Female   6  26 3331 - 0.800***   4554***
    2  25 - - 0.420  2532
6  Male   6  26 - - 0.200***  1119***
    2  25 3760 - 0.580  3348
In all cases females control the allocation in the second of the variants in each 
comparison. Males control allocation in the first variant. 
* indicates significant at 10% level, 2 tailed test 
** indicates significant at 5% level, 2 tailed test 
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Table 6. Evidence on reciprocity in 6 variants. 





2  Slope = 0?  Slope = 1? 
Sironko      




0.295 No Yes 




0.617 No No 




0.001 Yes Yes 




0.088 Yes Yes 
Bufumbo      




0.087 Yes Yes 




0.092 Yes Yes 
￿No￿ =hypothesis rejected at 95% level; ￿Yes￿ = hypothesis not rejected at 95% 
level. 
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Table 7. Male and female contributions when sharing rule is 50:50. 
 Comparison  Gender  Variant N  Contributions  p-value 
1  Male   1  26 3615 0.614 
   Female  7  32 3547  
2  Male   4  30 1567 0.552 
   Female  4  30 1510  
p-values from a 2-tailed t-test with unequal variances   42
 
Table 8. Tobit regression of contribution rates and socio-economic 
characteristics of spouses. 















Bufumbo  -0.3463***  0.0594 -0.3093*** 0.0513 -0.1841***  0.0677 
Same 
occupation 
0.0552* 0.0289 0.0377 0.0295  0.0861**  0.0394 
Spouse is 
teacher 
0.1708* 0.0975 0.1736 0.0000  0.1609* 0.0965 
Same 
education 
0.0602** 0.0272  0.0607**  0.0274  0.0211  0.0368 
Spouse￿s age 
(log) 
-0.0931** 0.0448  -0.1019**  0.0467  -0.1592** 0.0644 
Constant 0.9353***  0.1581  0.7894***  0.1635  -0.1841***  0.0677 
Number of 
observations  
240 182   189   
LR chi
2   105.08  87.51 57.32   
Prob > chi
2   0.0000  0.0000 0.0000;   
Log 
likelihood  
-92.7415 83.6888; 93.5648;   
Pseudo R
2 0.3616  0.3433 0.2364   
Notes: 
1.  Coefficients on controls (dummy variables) for each game omitted from table 
2. For the pooled equation, wife is used for the age and teacher variables. 
* indicates significant at 10% level, 2 tailed test 
** indicates significant at 5% level, 2 tailed test 
*** indicates significant at 1% level, 2 tailed test   43
  
Table 9. Reciprocity of spouses to their partners￿ contributions estimated using 
Tobit regression. 









Spouse￿s contribution  1.4698***  0.223  0.730**  0.369 
Same occupation  177.530  316.315  -726.600**  349.628 
Same education  408.921  282.450  -304.583  334.182 
Spouse￿s age (log)  -512.488  401.092  1454.176**  577.146 
Constant 1677.465  1483.044  -4496.246*  2629.102 
        
Number of observations   77 75    
LR chi
2   66.68 18.35    
Prob > chi
2   0.0000 0.0054   
Log likelihood   579.956 604.303   
Pseudo R
2 0.0544 R
2 = 0.0150   
Notes: 
1.  Coefficients on controls (dummy variables) for each variant omitted from table 
* indicates significant at 10% level, 2 tailed test 
** indicates significant at 5% level, 2 tailed test 
*** indicates significant at 1% level, 2 tailed test 
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Table 10. External bargaining power and female receipts. 
Dependent variable: female receipts  Coefficient t-statistic Probability 
Constant 425.28 0.47 0.641 
Bufumbo -781.17 -2.80 0.007 
Male control  188.08 0.76 0.449 
Equal -712.43 -1.80 0.077 
Male endowment  0.889 2.23 0.029 
Keep 593.52 2.19 0.032 
N=68, F(5,62)=4.52, prob> F = 0.0007. R
2=0.250,  
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 Figure 1. Proportion of total surplus realised in each of the games. 
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